“As I understand it, you intend to present witnesses who will testify that a few months before the new year, Samuel Moser accused the defendant of misconduct at the Westmont Country Club. Mr. Chesterfield was very angry and resigned from the club. Then, two days before the new year, someone sent a box of poisoned chocolates to Mr. Moser. He was on a diet and gave the candy to Sophie Randall, his secretary. Mrs. Randall ate some of the candy and died of cyanide poisoning. You think you can prove that Robert Chesterfield put cyanide in the candy and sent it to Mr. Moser because he was angry at Mr. Moser, and this is the basis for the murder charge involving Mrs. Randall and the attempted murder charge involving Mr. Moser. How am I doing?”
“Just fine, Your Honor,” Ragland said.
“Okay. Now, there is another indictment containing charges our jury will not be asked to decide. In that case, you’re allegingthat Mr. Chesterfield and Arthur Gentry were courting a woman named Lily Dowd and that Mr. Chesterfield poisoned his rival for Mrs. Dowd’s affections so he could get rid of him and marry Mrs. Dowd. Am I good so far, Mr. Ragland?”
“Yes.”
“Mr. Ragland, is it your contention that you should be able to tell the jurors about Mr. Gentry’s death when it’s deciding whether Mr. Chesterfield is guilty of killing Mrs. Randall and attempting to kill Mr. Moser?”
“Yes, Your Honor.”
Beathard turned to Regina. “You don’t think Mr. Ragland should be allowed to tell the jury about the evidence in the Gentry case, do you, Miss Barrister?”
“No, I don’t.”
“And you want me to rule that the Gentry evidence is inadmissible in this trial?”
“Yes.”
“Since this is your motion, Miss Barrister, you have the burden of convincing me that the State is wrong when Mr. Ragland argues that the Gentry evidence should be heard by our jury. Proceed.”
Regina stood and addressed the court. “Your Honor, it’s a well-established rule that the State can’t introduce evidence of crimes not charged in an indictment to prove that the defendant is guilty of the crimes charged. The reason for this rule is obvious. If a person is charged with murder and the State introduces evidence that he committed other unrelated crimes, the jurors might conclude that he must be guilty because he has criminal tendencies.
“If the crimes are similar, though unrelated to the crime alleged in the indictment, it would be a natural human tendency to conclude that the defendant must be guilty of the crime charged because he has committed the same type of crime in the past.”
“Aren’t there exceptions to this rule, Counselor?” Judge Beathard asked.
“Yes, five, but none apply in the case at bar.”
“What are the exceptions, and why don’t they apply to the Gentry evidence?”
“You can get evidence of other crimes before a jury if the evidence tends to establish the following: motive; intent; the absence of mistake or accident; a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the others; or the identity of the person charged with committing the crime on trial. It is Mr. Chesterfield’s contention that none of these exceptions apply in this case.”
“I think we can all agree that no one sends candy laced with cyanide to someone by mistake or accident,” the judge said. “Would you need to introduce evidence from the Gentry case in our case to prove that Mr. Chesterfield didn’t send the candy by mistake or accident, Mr. Ragland?”
“I might, Your Honor, if the defendant admitted sending the poisoned candy to Mr. Moser but claimed he didn’t know there was poison in the candy.”
“Is that what your client will say, Miss Barrister?” the judge asked.
“Mr. Chesterfield adamantly denies sending the candy to Mr. Moser.”
“Very well, Miss Barrister,” Judge Beathard said. “Let’s move to intent. Mr. Ragland, if you had solid proof that Mr. Chesterfield knowingly sent poison candy to Mr. Moser, it would be crystal clear, wouldn’t it, that he intended to kill Mr. Moser?”
“Yes.”
“So why would you need to introduce evidence from another poisoning case to make your point with the jury?”
Ragland fidgeted for a moment before conceding that he wouldn’t need to introduce evidence from Gentry to show intent under those circumstances.
“Tell me why the motive exception doesn’t apply, Miss Barrister.”
“Mr. Ragland is going to argue that Mr. Moser accused my client of cheating at cards and making unwanted advances to female members and employees of the Westmont Country Club, among other things, and that made Mr. Chesterfield so angry that he gave up his membership in the club. Then Mr. Ragland will argue that Mr. Chesterfield sent the poisoned candy to Mr. Moser because he hated Mr. Moser and wanted revenge.
“In the Gentry case, the State will try to prove that my client and Mr. Gentry were courting Lily Dowd, and Mr. Chesterfield killed Mr. Gentry to get rid of a rival for Mrs. Dowd’s hand.
“These motives are very different and have no relation to each other. Evidence from the Gentry case will not throw any light on the motive that prompted the attempt on Samuel Moser’s life.”
“What do you have to say about motive, Mr. Ragland?” Judge Beathard asked the prosecutor.