“Well, congratulations, Chief Leibermann,” Clete said when he had read the first page. “Who’s this from?”
“Clyde Holmes, the deputy director of FBI Operations,” Leibermann answered. “He’s probably number four in the Bureau hierarchy.”
“I’m impressed, and I think I may say, without fear of objection, that your promotion merits a celebratory libation. What would please you in that connection, Chief Leibermann?”
“A Johnnie Walker Black on the rocks, thank you, Colonel. But you better hold off on the congratulations until you have read the whole thing.”
Clete signaled for a maid and ordered her to bring the rolling bar onto the verandah.
“I presume, Chief, that I have your permission to share this bulletin of good fortune with my wife?”
“I think you all better read it,” Leibermann said matter-of-factly.
Clete handed the page he had read to Dorotea and started on the second page:In the conversation with the Director that set all this in motion, he said, “The end of the war in Germany means not that our work will be lessened, but rather increased, especially with regard to Soviet espionage in the United States.” Or words to that effect.
Much of this centers around the past, present, and future operations of the Office of Strategic Services, which, the Director feels, will shortly be disbanded.
The Director also stated that when the OSS is disbanded, he feels there will be an attempt by the Army, the Navy, and the State Department to absorb the OSS and its assets, and that doing so would be inimical to the Bureau’s ability to carry out its responsibilities, especially with regard to Soviet espionage.
If you’ll give this a moment’s thought, Milt, you will see that the Director is again right on the money. The Army and the Navy are rightly concentrated on taking the war to Japan. In that connection, the Soviets are regarded as our allies. The State Department is trying very hard to get the Soviets to declare war on the Japanese.
But the Director understands that the Bureau, in the discharge of its responsibilities, must look beyond the obvious and consider the realities.
The Director feels that the most unpleasant of these realities is that the most dangerous enemy the United States is facing is the Soviet Union, closely followed by very senior officers in the government who are unable, or unwilling, to face this fact and act accordingly.
The Bureau knows that our “Soviet allies” have been conducting intensive espionage activities with regard to the Manhattan Project. The reason we know is twofold. First, we have of course for some time been conducting our own counterintelligence efforts. Secondly, parties unknown passed to us, quite literally under the door, an envelope containing the names of Soviet agents within the Manhattan Project.
Some of these spies and traitors were already known to us, but six others were not. Further investigation by the Bureau revealed the six others are in fact Soviet espionage agents.
Who slipped the envelope under the door?
The Director believes the envelope came from Allen W. Dulles, the Assistant Director of the OSS for European Operations. Why the anonymous, surreptitious delivery?
“This guy seems to know what he’s talking about,” Clete said as he handed the second page to Dorotea.
“He generally does,” Leibermann said. “He’s a Mormon.”
“Excuse me?”
“A priest of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,” Leibermann explained. “They don’t drink or smoke, and while they bend the truth sometimes, they never lie. There’s a lot of them around J. Edgar Hoover.”
“I never heard that,” Clete said, and resumed reading the third page:The Director’s—and my—scenario here is that if Dulles had followed normal channels for the dissemination of intelligence such as this—in other words, if it had gone
to OSS Director Donovan, who would then have made President Roosevelt privy to it—the results would have almost certainly been disastrous.
It is impossible to say exactly what President Roosevelt would have done with the intelligence, or what President Truman would do with it now, except that once either had become privy to it, word would certainly have immediately reached the KGB First Directorate, via one or more of their subordinates, in a matter of days, even hours, and the Soviets would learn we were aware of their espionage activities and take the appropriate steps.
Director Donovan would have been fully aware of this, but would have been duty bound to pass this intelligence to the President.
It is entirely possible that Dulles decided that since passing the intelligence to Donovan would result in Donovan’s passing it to the President, the thing for him to do was simply not pass it to Donovan.
But what to do with it?
Slip it under the FBI’s door and place the burden of deciding whether or not to pass it to the President on the Director’s shoulders.
This brings us to the point of this.
The Director is not about to pass to the President any intelligence as significant as this without knowing both how accurate it is and where it came from. What he has done is to go unofficially to President Roosevelt and, now, President Truman and tell them he has unconfirmed intelligence he believes is accurate that the KGB First Directorate has successfully penetrated the Manhattan Project.